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Introduction
The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is no longer the organization it used to be. For the first four decades of its existence, it was mostly concerned with the collective defence of Western Europe. This meant contingency planning for a Soviet attack, keeping up military capabilities and having internal dialogue between the allies. Since the end of the Cold War, its activities have expanded. NATO has also become active in the field of crisis management through military operations. It furthermore engages in partnerships with third states and international organizations in bringing about collective security. The new Strategic Concept (NATO 2010) indeed notes that NATO now has three core tasks: collective defence, crisis management and collective security. 1 An important question is how substantive changes in international organizations affect the institutional machinery. Functionalist theory, for instance, expects institutions to follow substantive changes. As NATO carries out additional functions, there exists a clear rationale for institutional reform (Wallander and Keohane 1999) . We also know, however, that agreement among the member states constitutes a condition for change (e.g. Scharpf 1988; Pierson 2000; Tsebelis 2002; Nielson and Tierney 2003) . And if anything, the membership and preference heterogeneity within NATO have increased since the end of the Cold War. NATO is thus an exciting case to explore the research question under which conditions do international organizations change their institutions.
The empirical focus of this article is on the NATO International Staff, which constitutes the permanent Brussels-based secretariat. 2 The International Staff is headed by the Secretary-General and acts an agent of the member states in servicing the North Atlantic Council and its committees. It employs some 1250 officials and is at the heart of the machinery, yet constitutes only one part of the broader NATO system. 3 Functionalist theory expects that the substantive changes in NATO have an impact on the International Staff. A redistribution of resources within the International Staff towards crisis management and collective security is likely. This may require changes in the organizational structure. Principals are, however, likely to object to such institutional changes. Some have a vested interest in collective defence and may resent the shift of resources. Others may fear the inevitable uncertainty that institutional reform brings in terms of future payoffs and control over NATO.
As the literature on multiple principals suggests, this article shows that substantive and institutional reform do not have to go hand-in-hand. The diverging preferences of the member states have been a major obstacle for institutional change. Even reform-minded member states, such as the United States, fear that they lose control over the International Staff as a result of the consequences of institutional reform. Modest reform has nonetheless taken place. First, functional pressures can help the member states to overcome their differences. Making the International Staff ready for the challenging operation in Afghanistan, for instance, has resulted in reform. Second, there has been an incremental reallocation of resources to improve NATO's functioning in crisis management and 2 The International Staff remains understudied. This is one of the first articles to trace its institutional development since the end of the Cold War. 3 NATO also has a military decision-making structure with a Military Committee and an International Military Staff.
In addition, NATO has an extensive command structure and various agencies. Mayer (2014) sheds light on some of the other NATO institutions. Reform efforts (continue to) take place in the whole NATO machinery.
collective security. This process has mostly been beyond the formal control of the member states.
To conclude, preference heterogeneity cannot fully account for the institutional development of the NATO International Staff.
The starting point is the dilemma in the literature between functionalism and multiple principals in institutional reform. The article subsequently explores how the International Staff has focused increasingly on policy issues at the expense of support functions. It continues by tracing the three rounds of institutional reform. In the conclusion, the consequences for the scholarship on international organization are discussed.
Functionalism, Multiple Principals and Institutional Reform
Functionalist theory provides a useful baseline for a discussion on the reform of international organizations. It explains the existence of institutions in terms of their effects (Keohane 1984; also Pierson 2000) . The NATO International Staff facilitates the work of the Alliance by chairing committees, writing reports and decisions, monitoring the implementation of decisions and acting as a contact point for third parties. The member states could carry out these functions themselves, but they have 'outsourced' them (Tallberg 2002: 25) in the interests of neutrality, expertise, continuity and efficiency. It is interesting to add a temporal dimension to this functionalist theory (cf. Pierson 2004) . International organizations feel continuous pressure to adjust their functions and designs to environmental demands (Koremenos, Lipson and Snidal 2001; Dijkstra 2012) . For the case of NATO, the functionalist story is thus the following: the environment has changed since the end of Cold War. NATO has expanded its functions to survive. This has affected its institutional design as well.
Institutional reform does, however, not always follow the functionalist road (e.g. Streeck and Thelen 2005) . The literature on reform in international organizations deals, in particular, with the problématique of multiple principals and preference heterogeneity. Daniel Nielson and Michael Tierney (2003) , for example, show that only after preference convergence of the member states, the World Bank started to make its lending policies more environmentally friendly. Fritz Scharpf (1988) comes to similar conclusions. He shows how policies such as the European Union's (EU) Common
Agricultural Policy, which were once successful, became inefficient due to changing circumstances, yet were almost impossible to reform. George Tsebelis (2002) perhaps discusses these issues most elegantly in his work on veto players. He simply notes that "to change policies ... a certain number of ... actors have to agree to the proposed change" (p. 2).
Institutional reform is often regarded to be even more difficult to achieve than substantive reform (Pierson 2000: 490-491) . By being able to change the rules of the game, it becomes possible to engage in substantive reform afterwards. Multiple principals may therefore agree on a substantive change now, but are unlikely to agree to institutional change if there is uncertainty about how it affects their future payoffs (Jupille, Mattli and Snidal 2013) . This creates a status quo bias. To put it differently, institutional change might well be better for all member states involved, but if they are uncertain about it, they may still decide to stick with what they have.
The case of NATO is illustrative. The member states have been reasonably successful in achieving substantive reform, but much less so with regard to institutional reform. Substantive reform after the Cold War became inevitable for the survival of the alliance. To use the a popular phrase from a US senator, NATO had to go "out-of-area or out of business" (Lugar 1993 (Kleine 2013) , while lower positions may be subject to geographical balance. Third, contract policy also affects control with staff on permanent contracts having more autonomy than 'temporaries' or 'secondees' (Trondal 2006; Trondal, van den Berg and Suvarierol 2008) . Finally, large member states may have privileged access allowing them to exert excessive informal influence (Stone 2011) .
Faced with preference heterogeneity, is it possible to reform international organizations?
While scholars have suggested several 'exit mechanisms' from inefficient substantive policies (see They concern mainly consensus-promoting mechanisms (Scharpf 1988 and Falkner 2011) . Initiators of change need to convince the multiple principals that outcomes of reform are better than the status quo. The negotiation process is thus important (Finke, König, Proksch and Tsebelis 2012) . Scharpf (1988) concludes that only after a problem-solving rather than a confrontational style was adopted in EU and German negotiations, the principals were able to opt for reform. Such an approach seems important for NATO, where trust is critically important (Menon and Welsh 2011: 86) . In realizing institutional reform, the involvement of an 'honest broker' makes sense (Abbott and Snidal 1998: 22-23; Beach 2005; Tallberg 2006 ). Leadership by secretariat staff in creating an atmosphere of trust, explaining the effects of the reforms, and exercising authority is thus important.
Secretariat officials can also try to circumvent the direct control of the member states, as control mechanisms are costly (e.g. Hawkins et al. 2006 Table 1 . The first hypothesis follows from functionalist theory and the expectation that a change in substantive functions will affect institutional design. The second one states that multiple principals, which have different preferences and are uncertain about the effects of reform, form an obstacle to institutional change. The final hypothesis notes that Secretariat leadership improves that chances of institutional change. These three hypotheses will be used to guide the empirical sections in the remainder of this article. They are mentioned where they help to explain instances of reform. The conclusion of this article further discusses the importance of these hypotheses and how they can be used to improve our understanding of institutional reform.
5 A competing hypothesis in the public administration literature is that bureaucrats themselves use their discretion to block institutional change (for classic statements on inertia and bureaucratic interests, see Merton 1940 and Downs 1967) . In the case of NATO, officials have an interest in keeping their organization relevant. This has made many of them, as will be shown empirically, advocates of institutional reform.
More Tooth, Less Tail: The International Staff in Numbers
This first empirical section presents an overview of developments in the NATO International Staff (1989 with an emphasis on staff resources. It shows two things. First, the expansion of NATO's substantive functions has not led to an increase in overall resources. The member states have kept the civil budget flat. This has been an obstacle for change, as it meant that staff resources for NATO's new tasks had to come at the expense of its original function. Second, member states have had much less control over how the civil budget is spent within the International Staff. Since the end-1990s, the number of policy staff has incrementally increased, while support staff has been cut. Savings at the lower end of the hierarchy have thus been used to allow the International Staff to work on NATO's new tasks. This is points towards the limits of full control by the member states.
The starting point is overall budgetary policy. For most of the last two decades, France has insisted on zero budgetary growth, as it sees NATO in direct competition with the emerging security structures in the EU (preference heterogeneity, hypothesis #2). This trend continues. For example, the current overall decrease in staff numbers will mostly impact on the support categories (interview #5).
In addition to this strong shift from technical to policy personnel, there are also developments in the allocation of resources between divisions. Executive Management, which brings together most of the support functions, for example, accounts for some 35% of officials. Under the current financial pressures, this overhead is being cut away (interview #12). Budgetary cuts are also made in the Public Diplomacy Division, which will become less of a priority with the end of the Afghanistan mission in 2014. Similarly, the Operations Division will decrease in size. These are functional responses to the changes in the environment and therefore support hypothesis #1.
There have furthermore been structural reforms. To increase staff, for instance, the 
Reforming the NATO Secretariat after the Cold War
The second empirical part of the article analyzes the reform efforts more in detail. At the time of the fall of the Berlin War, the Division of Political Affairs had 49 staff members of whom 25 worked on Information and Press (Mouritzen 1990 targets" (#5). After one-and-a-half year, the outside consultants hired for reform were sent home and very little reached the North Atlantic Council (interview #4). It was an instance of an overcrowded agenda and a lack of leadership (support for hypothesis #3).
The Robertson reforms were more significant in terms of structural changes. Following the intervention in Kosovo and with a view to the operation in Afghanistan, the Crisis Management and
Operations Directorate became a division in its own right (Operations Division). This was a clear reflection of the priority area that crisis management operations had become for NATO. It was, once again, the logical thing to do from a functionalist perspective (hypothesis #1). It was also an instance in which the overriding interest of NATO trumped the parochial opposition of some of the member states, including some of the newer member states that continued to champion NATO's role in collective defence.
The establishment of the Operations Division set in motion some further structural changes.
Since As noted above, contract policy is one way for the member states to control the secretariat.
Permanent officials have more autonomy than temporary staff, as they build up expertise and are more difficult to get rid of. That Robertson and successive Secretaries-General have had quite some authority over the contracts of their own staff is thus remarkable (interview #12).
The appreciation in the International Staff of this reform was mixed (see also This is not the kind of flexibility that we need and that we are used to in my country". The other agrees, indefinite contracts "made him very popular but it was not a smart move for the organization".
Others, on the other hand, identify with the need to have an esprit de corps and possibilities for internal career enhancement (interview #4 and #8). Many officials object to the fact that under
Secretary-General Rasmussen, contract policy is going in the opposite direction. Since 2012, it is no longer possible for most policy staff to work in the International Staff for more than six years. As a result, one interviewee notes, "[w]e will no longer build up experience like we used to" (#5).
Another states that "[a] lot of experience and memory gets lost. NATO is also no longer a career" (#8). Finally, one interviewee nuances the discussion: "there is some disquiet in the organization ... but we will get to a good balance eventually" (#2). An interviewee argued that "he was not in a position of authority vis-à-vis the nations, and the staff and everyone" (#3). Importantly, once the United States realized that it would lose high-level posts in the International Staff as a result of the reforms, it withdrew its support (interview #7).
In other words, preference heterogeneity and the risk of the loss of control made the member states wary of the proposals (hypothesis #2). The bargaining style and the lack of leadership did not help either (hypothesis #3). Finally, contrary to the previous and 2012 reform efforts, there was less of a functional need to change the organization (hypothesis #1). It is therefore not surprising that not much was implemented. In fact, few interviewees spontaneously talked about the Vahr reforms.
One interesting change is perhaps the physical co-location of officials from the International Staff and International Military Staff. As the debates over co-location display some of the political struggles over institutional design, it is worth to elaborate a bit.
NATO has always had parallel civilian and military structures. In the Brussels headquarters, (Mouritzen 2013: 9) . The compromise following the Vahr report was to physically co-located offices without changing the reporting hierarchies.
The experience so far is mixed. One interviewee notes that "[i]t has proofed successful" (#9). Others question whether the impact was significant. An interviewee states that "[t]his has been a cosmetic change ... [t] he 100 meters between the offices was never the obstacle. People were already able to find each other" (#6). Similarly, one states "I do not see a difference. There is no difference, very little difference. Physical co-location is not the same as decision-making structures" (#2). Importantly is that the whole operation of moving offices has been costly. Furthermore, it is relevant to mention that when NATO moves into its new headquarters (currently foreseen in 2016), offices will continue to be co-located. made International Staff reform an even greater necessity. The approach to reform under Rasmussen had a much stronger problem-solving dynamic (hypothesis #3). In addition, this latest reform effort benefited from the personal leadership of the Secretary-General . Despite all these odds in favor of the Rasmussen reforms, the member states still decided to not to adopt the package. The priorities of the member states in international security remain heterogeneous and, as a result, the member states could not agree on how to distribute key posts in this new structure (hypothesis #2).
It is useful to shortly discuss these senior posts further, as they are an important way for the member states of exerting influence (Kleine 2013 This article has shown that institutional form does not automatically follow function.
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The preference heterogeneity of the member states has, as expected, been a major obstacle for change 
